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As we detail below, these experiments show that both
behavioral tasks and functional magnetic resonance im-
aging (fMRI) generate a more general view of rewardA recent flurry of neuroimaging and decision-making
experiments in humans, when combined with single- processing than simple prediction errors. In particular,
dopaminoceptive regions like the orbitofrontal cortexunit data from orbitofrontal cortex, suggests major
additions to current models of reward processing. We and striatum (OFS circuits) appear to be involved in
valuation schemes meeting some of the needs de-review these data and models and use them to develop
a specific computational relationship between the scribed above. We discuss one natural model that
emerges from the data, the prediction-valuation model,value of a predictor and the future rewards or punish-
ments that it promises. The resulting computational and show that its basic predictions match neural data
from orbitofrontal neurons. Remarkably, this model hasmodel, the predictor-valuation model (PVM), is shown
to anticipate a class of single-unit neural responses close ties to the option pricing theory from finance litera-
ture and may well represent a biological substrate un-in orbitofrontal and striatal neurons. The model also
suggests how neural responses in the orbitofrontal- derlying such approaches to human economic behavior.
striatal circuit may support the conversion of disparate
types of future rewards into a kind of internal currency, Computational Interpretation of Phasic
that is, a common scale used to compare the valuation Dopaminergic Activity
of future behavioral acts or stimuli. During the 1980’s and early 1990’s, chronic single-unit
recordings from midbrain dopaminergic neurons in alert
Introduction monkeys showed that they give phasic responses to
A general function of neural tissue is ongoing economic food and fluid rewards, novel stimuli, and stimuli eliciting
evaluation, a central function for any system that must orienting reactions (e.g., Romo and Schultz, 1990). This
operate with limited resources, that is, all mobile crea- experimental work has flourished in recent years and
tures. All mobile creatures run on batteries; they must has provided strong connections between dopaminer-
continually acquire nutrients and expel wastes in order gic activity and behavioral output (for review see
to reproduce and survive. Consequently, the way that Schultz, 2002 [this issue of Neuron]). In particular, this
mobile creatures value their internal states, sensory ex- work has begun to lean more heavily on the computa-
perience, and behavioral output influences directly how tional learning theory (Montague and Sejnowski, 1994;
they will invest their time and energy. Our perspective Montague et al., 1994, 1996; Schultz et al., 1997; Egel-
here is focused. By economic evaluation, we refer to man et al., 1998; Dayan et al., 2000) and psychological
the problems that an individual nervous system faces theories of conditioning (Waelti et al., 2001; Schultz and
when making rapid, moment-to-moment decisions pos- Dickinson, 2000). Overall, this work suggests that activ-
sessing real costs and potential future payoffs (good ity changes in a subset of dopamine neurons in the
and bad). A central feature of this problem is the need ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra represent
for an internal currency that can be used as a common prediction errors in the time and amount of future re-
scale to value diverse behavioral acts and sensory warding events; that is, changes in spike rate encode
stimuli. an ongoing difference between experienced reward and
The need for common valuation scales arises from long-term predicted reward. Increases in spike rate
the sheer breadth and variety of information available mean “better than predicted,” decreases in spike rate
to a creature’s nervous system. Do I chase this new prey mean “worse than predicted,” and no change in spike
or do I continue nibbling on my last kill? Do I continue to rate means “just as expected.”
drink from this pond or do I switch to foraging nearby Figure 1 illustrates the way in which activity changes
for food? Do I run from the possible predator that I see in dopaminergic neurons are thought to convey informa-
in the bushes or the one that I hear? Do I chase that tion about prediction errors in future reward. Figure 1A
potential mate or do I wait around for something better? shows a summary of how spike production in dopamin-
ergic neurons changes with learning, and Figure 1B
shows a qualitative summary of the results in (A). The3 Correspondence: read@bcm.tmc.edu (P.R.M.), gberns@emory.edu
(G.S.B.) basic computational model that captures these data
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Figure 1. Dopamine Neurons Encode a Temporal Prediction-Error Signal in Their Phasic Spike Activity
(A) Recordings from single units in primate ventral tegmental area during simple learning tasks have shown that dopamine neurons emit a
signal consistent with a prediction error in future reward. Raster plots of spike times overlayed with histogram of spike activity. The qualitative
changes are most important here, but for scale, the transient in the middle trace is approximately 15 spikes/s. In a naı¨ve animal, the unexpected
delivery of a positive reinforcer (R) causes an increase in spike rate (positive prediction error), but the earlier presence of a neutral cue or no
cue (labeled no CS) causes no significant change in activity (top traces). If the delivery of reward is consistently preceded by a sensory cue,
two changes occur in the phasic firing of the dopamine neurons: (1) the response to the reward (R) sinks back into baseline, and (2) a positive
response grows locked to the earliest consistent predictor (middle trace). The omission of an expected reward results in a decrease in spike
output (negative prediction error) at the time of the expected reward. All traces are aligned to the solenoid activation that delivers the reward,
R (juice squirt) (bottom trace).
(B) Qualitative summary of the measured effects illustrated in (A).
derives from a model for prediction learning called the both the instruction light and trigger signal elicit phasic
activation of these neurons. Moreover, the phasic acti-method of temporal differences or TD learning for short
(Sutton, 1988; Sutton and Barto, 1998). The ultimate goal vation following the trigger cue is more spread out (un-
certain) through time, a feature that parallels that uncer-in TD learning is for a system to learn to predict the time
and amount of future rewards or punishments. A key tainty in the time of arrival of the trigger cue. The
prediction-error model responses are shown beneathsignal in this computational learning procedure is the
TD error, which represents a prediction error in the long- each of these data plots and show that the model can
account for these detailed spike data.term estimate of the average reward that is expected
from time t into the distant future. It is precisely this TD The data discussed above (Figures 1–3) and the model
that captures them suggest strongly that the signal emit-error signal that has been proposed as the prediction
error signal emitted by midbrain dopaminergic neurons ted by dopamine neurons goes well beyond the simple
idea that dopamine delivery simply equals reward. Re-(Figure 2; Montague and Sejnowski, 1994; Montague et
al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997). Details of the model can cent data on dopamine release in freely moving rats
now makes such an equivalence untenable (Garris et al.,be found in Appendix A, and an example of how it cap-
tures the basic electrophysiological results is shown in 1999; Kilpatrick et al., 2000). Figure 4 shows an ongoing
dopamine measurement made in the nucleus accum-Figure 2.
Figure 3 compares the model’s performance against bens of alert rats while they press a bar to activate
their own ventral tegmental area through an implantedsingle-unit recordings for a task in which multiple sen-
sory cues predict a terminal reward, but the temporal electrode. Early on during the self-stimulation, each bar
press elicits large, rapid transients in dopamine release.consistency of the second cue is varied. For the tempo-
rally consistent case, cue 1 is always followed by cue Shortly thereafter, these same transients in dopamine
delivery cannot be detected despite continued bar2 with a fixed 1 s delay. Cue 2 acts as the behavioral
trigger, which releases the animal to execute a simple pressing by the animal (vertical black bars) and, hence,
continued electrical stimulation through the implantedaction to obtain reward (here, a juice squirt). Early on
during training, the dopamine cells gave a phasic burst electrode (Figure 4). The animal is not simply stuck in a
repetitive behavior because the electrical stimulation isto reward delivery and no response to either of the two
predictive cues. The results shown here are after training required to maintain the bar pressing behavior whether
or not dopamine is released at the target structure (here,has occurred, and clearly the phasic response is now
linked to the earliest consistent reward-predicting cue the nucleus accumbens). A similar self-stimulation ex-
periment making dopamine measurements in the dorsal(instruction light). The situation changes completely if
the second cue is made to vary in its time, but not striatum revealed analogous results (Kilpatrick et al.,
2000; data not shown). These results, when consideredits probability of arrival (100% schedule). After training,
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Figure 2. Temporal Difference Model Captures Basic Electrophysiological Observations in Midbrain Dopamine Neurons
Temporal difference model captures basic electrophysiological observations in midbrain dopamine neurons. The basic response features of
Figure 1 are reproduced in a temporal difference model.
(A) Hypothesized architecture. Sensory stimuli, processed by modules M1 and M2, provides inputs to ventral tegmental area (VTA) neurons
in the form of a temporal derivative (d/dt). The VTA neuron also receives direct input r(t), representing the time-varying reward signal. By
adding these signals, the VTA neuron emits a signal, (t), equivalent to the prediction error used in temporal difference learning (that is, (t) 
r(t)  V(t1) – V(t), where V(t1) – V(t)) is one discrete approximation to d/dt). This signed error signal can be used in a correlational synaptic
learning rule to permit the system to learn predictions of future reward, which are then stored as synaptic strengths (W). Such a rule has been
called a predictive Hebbian rule, and weights are updated as: Wnew  Wold  x(t)(t), where x(t) is the presynaptic activity and  is a learning
rate (see Montague and Sejnowski, 1994; panels [A] and [B] adapted from Montague et al., 1996 [copyright 1996 by the Society for Neuroscience]
and Schultz et al., 1997 [reprinted with permission from Schultz et al., 1997. Copyright 1997, American Association for the Advancement of
Science]).
(B) The basic response features of Figure 1 are reproduced in a temporal difference model. In this example, two sensory cues are presented
(red light at time 10, green light at time 20) on each trial followed by a reward at time 60. Early in training, the delivery of unexpected reward
is accompanied by a phasic increase in the firing rate. As training proceeds, the reward response sinks back to baseline (in this noiseless
example, baseline is 0), and a response grows to the earliest consistent sensory cue. This model does not distinguish between sensory-
sensory prediction and sensory-reward prediction. The system learns both the time of the second light and the time and magnitude of the
reward. Nondelivery of the reward results in a downward deflection in activity to reproduce the data shown in Figure 1. This simple model captures
a wide array of experimental data; however, dopamine neuron responses are known to be richer than the collection shown in Figure 1.
in combination with single-unit activity shown in Figures probe, fMRI cannot measure directly the efflux of dopa-
mine or other neuromodulators. Despite this measure-1 and 3, provide convincing evidence that phasic
changes in dopamine delivery are not the singular physi- ment limitation, one can still use fMRI to make meaning-
ful differentiations between reward and the rewardcal substrate of reinforcement. However, they leave
open the possibility that some function of the average expectancy in the human brain. Another major limitation
for studying reward processing in humans is the profli-dopamine level may contribute directly to the reinforcing
qualities of a stimulus. These experiments are consistent gate use to which the term reward is subjected. Reward
is used in many ways in many contexts, and it is oftenwith the prediction error hypothesis for dopaminergic
spike activity, even though extra filtering is apparently used interchangeably with the term reinforcement.
Hence, one must be careful to delimit its meaning in anytaking place at the level of dopamine release.
Overall, these data suggest a basic computational particular experiment. Most investigators have taken the
definition of reward to be a stimulus that can act as arole for dopamine neurons as detectors of ongoing
changes in predictability, an important first-level analy- positive reinforcer, although in any given experiment, a
reward may or may not be used to reinforce anything.sis that must be done on information sequentially
streaming into any neural system. Changes in predict- In humans, reward generally takes the form of appetitive
stimuli (food, water, drugs) or money. There has beenability act as markers for epochs during which important
information is being detected or processed. Such event a proliferation of human experiments probing reward
expectancy in humans using fMRI, and these may wellmarkers provide a natural signal to start or stop learning
and to direct attention, two informational roles in which serve to define new and more highly differentiated no-
tions of reward, that is, more detailed, algorithmic de-dopamine is known to be a major player. This perspec-
tive on dopaminergic processing will certainly continue scriptions.
Brain Response to Primary Rewardto evolve as new data are generated, but more impor-
tantly, they provide a conceptual and computational and Its Predictability
A straightforward approach to the study of reward pro-structure for understanding recent work on reward ex-
pectancy in human brains. cessing in humans is to probe the brain’s response to
primary reward, i.e., appetitive stimuli. The acute effects
of cocaine, for example, are associated with increasedHuman Brain Imaging of Reward Expectancy
A recent flurry of neuroimaging results in humans has striatal activity, which also correlates with subjective
responses (Breiter et al., 1997). In our work, we haveprovided a step forward in understanding reward pro-
cessing in humans. However, there are constraints that focused on the role of predictability in the brain’s re-
sponse to gustatory stimuli. The approach is simple:limit the study of reward processing in humans with
noninvasive brain imaging. For example, as a neural take a particular stimulus, render it either predictable or
Neuron
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Figure 3. Response of Prediction-Error Model to Temporally Consistent and Temporally Inconsistent Sensory Cues
Development of prediction error signal through training, using two successive sensory cues followed by reward (juice). The variable of interest
in these experiments is the consistency of the temporal relationship between the two predictive sensory stimuli. A sequence, cue 1 (instruction)→
cue 2 (trigger) → reward, was given repeatedly to an alert primate while recording from single midbrain dopamine neurons. Each cue always
occurred prior to reward delivery and in the order shown; therefore, both cues were predictors of reward. These raster plots and firing rate
histograms are taken from experiments with a monkey already trained on the tasks.
(Top) In the temporally consistent case (left, top), cue 1 (instruction) and cue 2 (trigger) were separated by a fixed 1 s delay. In the temporally
inconsistent cases (right, top), cue 1 (instruction) and cue 2 (trigger) were separated by a variable and unpredictable 1.5–3.0 s delay (random
times in this range were used). In the temporally consistent case, the phasic change in dopamine neuron firing rate is associated only with
the time of cue 1 onset. However, for the inconsistent case, the phasic change in dopamine neuron firing rate is associated with the onset
of both cue 1 and cue 2. In addition, the extra spikes produced subsequent to the trigger stimulus are more spread out through time, as
though the circuit is more uncertain about the expected time of onset of the second cue. The time of movement onset in each trial is indicated
by a larger black marker, and the trials have been shuffled and ordered according to this time of movement onset (red arrows). Scale bar at
top is 20 spikes/s.
(Bottom) Prediction-error model response. These effects of temporal consistency are captured in the prediction-error model response shown
below each respective experiment. Time progresses from left to right, and individual learning trials progress in the direction of the green
arrows marked progression of learning. As before, the phasic change in dopamergic activity is shown as a signed quantity labeled delta and
represents the change in activity from baseline. In the temporally inconsistent case, the model is unable to discount the arrival of cue 2
because its time of arrival after cue 1 is not sufficiently consistent (predictable), a finding that reproduces the experimental result (adapted
from Montague et al., 1996 [copyright 1996 by the Society for Neuroscience]).
unpredictable, and measure the associated brain re- tatory stimuli (juice and water) because: (1) they repre-
sent a very basic form of appetitive reward, (2) theysponse in systems thought to process the stimulus. This
has been applied in the context of visual and motor are used routinely in primate experiments on reward
expectancy (Schultz, 1998), and (3) they can both betasks (Berns et al., 1997; Bischoff-Grethe et al., 2000),
but here, we focus on the brain response to changes in used to reinforce behavior.
In our first experiment, we delivered sequences ofpredictability for rewarding gustatory stimuli. The human
brain response to gustatory stimuli is robust; both gusta- small (0.8 ml) juice and water squirts to humans, manipu-
lated the predictability of the sequences, and measuredtory stimuli and their predictors can generate responses
detectable using fMRI. Several brain imaging studies the brain response using fMRI (Berns et al., 2001; Figure
5). The receipt of juice or water alone evoked widespreadhave demonstrated activation of orbitofrontal cortex by
a range of gustatory stimuli (Rolls, 2000; O’Doherty et activation throughout the brain, including orbitofrontal
cortex and motor areas (data not shown). The brainal., 2001, 2002; Zald et al., 2002).
As discussed above (Figures 1–3), the predictability response to juice alone did not differ from the brain
response to water alone; that is, irrespective of predict-of a primary rewarding stimulus is a critical parameter for
activation of reward pathways in both rats and monkeys. ability, subtracting the juice alone fMRI response from
the water alone fMRI response yielded no significantConsequently, the predictability of a sequence of stimuli
may itself recruit reward-related neural structures in a activation in any voxels. However, as indicated in Figure
5, when difference images were computed to uncovermanner detectable with fMRI in humans. We chose gus-
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experiments, we sought to separate the influence of
these two sources of predictability changes.
To separate the influence of stimulus predictability
and temporal predictability, we broke the sequential
stimulus (Figure 6A) into its component parts (Figures
6B and 6C). In this event-related design, we sought to
characterize the influence of changes in temporal pre-
dictability. A juice squirt was paired in time with a light
that preceded it by a fixed time interval. During training,
the time between the light-juice pairs was randomized,
but the schedule of reinforcement was 100%. After train-
ing, catch trials with a new (unexpected) time for juice
delivery were inserted at random in an otherwise normal
training sequence. Contrast images were formed be-
tween the brain response to juice at the expected and
unexpected times. As illustrated (Figures 6B and 6C),
this paradigm has been carried out using both a passive
and active (instrumental) design.
In the active task, subjects pressed a button after
onset of a green light, and juice was delivered 4 s later.
The average time from light onset to button press was
1.5 s. In the catch trials, juice delivery was delayed anFigure 4. Dopamine Release Does Not Equal Pleasure and Is Not
extra 4 s, allowing for the measurement of the brainLinearly Related to Changes in Spiking
response to a time-locked reward prediction error (Fig-Ascending connections from the midbrain distribute a prediction
ure 6C). Early reward delivery was not investigated dueerror signal (t) in the form of increases (better than expected),
decreases (worse than expected), or no change (just as expected) to the difficulty in separating hemodynamic responses
in spike activity. It has long been thought that dopamine release less than 4 s apart. As shown in Figure 7, the time course
was equivalent to the subjective pleasure or euphoria that attends of the hemodynamic response in the ventral striatum
stimuli that increase dopamine release in target neural structures. indicated a robust activation at precisely the time when
Recent experiments by Wightman and colleagues (Garris et al.,
juice was expected, but not received (Pagnoni et al.,1999) show that there is not a simple equivalence between dopamine
2002). Here, the change in activity in the ventral striatumrelease and pleasure. They used cyclic voltammetry to measure
appears to be locked to the error in reward prediction.dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens and striatum of alert,
freely moving rats, while the rats pressed a bar to stimulate their The passive task, as illustrated in Figure 6B, presented
own ventral tegmental area through an implanted electrode. an analogous design to subjects. A yellow light was
(A) Vertical black bars indicate times at which the animal pressed followed 6 s later by the same juice squirt used in the
the bar to receive stimulation. Each stimulus (single vertical bar)
active task. This time is comparable to the active taskwas a repetitive train of 24 current pulses delivered at 60 Hz. The
since the average time to button press was 1.5 s,filled arrowhead represents an experimenter-delivered stimulation.
making a total of 5.5 s from light to reward delivery inEarly on during self-stimulation, large transients in dopamine were
measured; however, as the animal continued to bar press (self- training runs. In both tasks, the extra delay on catch
stimulate), the measured dopamine release dropped to 0 despite trials was 4 s. Remarkably, the passive task uncovered
continued stimulation. strong, specific activity in the dorsal striatum locked to
(B) Same animal 30 min after the self-stimulation experiment in (A). the reward prediction error (data not shown; Samuel
As before, the rat will continue self-stimulate to deliver an electrical
McClure, personal communication). This work is stillstimulus to the implanted electrode; however, there was no change
underway with many important questions still open.in the measured dopamine release.
These activations may reflect responses participating(C) Dopamine transients can still be elicited by unexpected experi-
menter-delivered stimuli delivered to the same implanted electrode in making predictions or may reflect true prediction error
used for the self-stimulation experiments in (A) and (B). These experi- responses. In either case, one would expect a strong
ments show clearly that dopamine release does not equate with brain response to be temporally locked to the reward
pleasure and that the spikes that travel from dopamine neurons, prediction error signal. Further experiments are required
regardless of what they represent computationally, may or may not
to separate the contribution of the predictions (inputs)elicit dopamine release onto target structures (adapted from Garris
and the prediction error (output).et al., 1999; copyright 1999 by Nature, www.nature.com).
Brain Response to Monetary Reward,
Its Anticipation, and Its Context
the brain response to changes in the predictability of Recent studies have demonstrated a correlation be-
the sequences, highly significant activation occurred tween the relative magnitude of monetary reinforcement
throughout the ventral striatum including strong activa- and the fMRI signal in both ventral striatum (Delgado et
tion in the nucleus accumbens. In this first experiment, al., 2000) and orbitofrontal cortex (Knutson et al., 2000;
we sought to change only predictability; however, there Breiter et al., 2001). The importance of this work derives
are two sources of prediction–what stimulus arrives next in part from the abstract nature of a monetary reward.
(stimulus prediction) and when the next stimulus occurs Money represents value to an individual but in a poten-
(temporal prediction). In the predictable run, both the tially idiosyncratic way. It is therefore significant that the
time and identity of the next stimulus is predictable. In brain response in the orbitofrontal-striatal (OFS) circuit
the unpredictable run, neither the time nor the identity correlates with relative monetary reward, and this re-
sponse is consistent across subjects.of the next stimulus is predictable. In our subsequent
Neuron
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Figure 5. Change in Predictability of Sequential Gustatory Stimuli Activates Dopaminergic Targets
Changes in predictability of sequential stimuli mark epochs during which important information is being detected or processed. As shown
above in Figure 1, midbrain dopamine systems give phasic responses to such changes in predictability. Dopamine has a powerful influence
on neural activity and a direct effect on microvasculature (Krimer et al., 1998); therefore, we sought to test whether changes in predictability
in sequential stimuli could be detected in human subjects using fMRI. In this experiment, two sources of predictability were concurrently
changed in an effort to seek a maximal response. (1) The probability, Pd, that the next stimulus was different from the current stimulus changed
from Pd  1 in the predictable sequence to Pd  1/2 in the unpredictable sequence. (2) The time boundaries of each fluid stimulus were
randomized, but the average inter-stimulus time was held at a constant 10 s. This latter change was accomplished by randomly sampling a
Poisson interval distribution with an average interval of 10 s. The fixed time between stimuli in the predictable trial was 10 s.
(A) Boluses of juice (red bars) and water (black bars) were delivered in either predictable or unpredictable sequences, and changes in the
BOLD response were measured.
(B) Two difference images were computed for all brain voxels and are labeled here as U and P. These difference images will exclude common
regions of activation associated with juice and water delivery and the swallowing movement that ensues. In this manner, these contrasts
reveal the brain response only to changes in predictability for the sequential gustatory stimuli.
(C) Reward-related regions had a greater BOLD response to the unpredictable sequence than to the predictable sequence (U). Note the
bilateral activation of the nucleus accumbens (left). Although not visible in this coronal view, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, a dopaminergic
target structure, also showed strong activation for the U contrast. Significance thresholded at p  0.001 and a spatial extent of greater than
ten contiguous voxels. Pseudo-color scale shows the results of a T score with 24 degrees of freedom (n 25 subjects). In this initial experiment,
both stimulus predictability (what comes next) and temporal predictability (when next stimulus arrives) were changed. In Figure 6, we break
the sequence into its components and show how we test only the contribution of changes in temporal predictability (see Berns et al., 2001).
As with appetitive rewards, the brain response to mon- in the striatum, where the response to anticipated re-
ward is largest when contrasted to the anticipation ofetary reward is not static. For example, the brain re-
sponse for an impending monetary reward (or punish- impending loss (Breiter et al., 2001). These experiments
suggest that the OFS represents more than a simplement) will transfer to a conditioned stimulus (light or
abstract figure) through the appropriate pairing of the reward prediction error. We develop this possibility be-
low but first present behavioral tasks designed to probeconditioned stimulus and monetary reward. The condi-
tioned stimulus evokes a response in the striatum (Knut- directly the prediction-error model as a biasing signal
for action choice.son et al., 2001) and orbitofrontal cortex (O’Doherty et
al., 2001) that scales with the size of the reward predic-
tion. Consistent with these findings, other work has Biasing Action Choice Using Prediction Errors
As discussed above, the prediction-error model is ashown that the striatal response appears to be maximal
during anticipation of impending reward (Breiter et al., fruitful starting point for understanding the possible
meaning of spike activity in midbrain dopamine neurons2001). It is well known that the context in which a reward
is offered (“framed”) affects the behavioral valuation of and interpreting fMRI experiments on reward expec-
tancy in human subjects. There are numerous reasonsthe reward (Kahneman and Tverksy, 1979).
In two recent studies, the contextual effect was the to suspect that the same prediction error signal, en-
coded as phasic changes in dopamine delivery, is useddominant influence on the OFS brain response (Elliott
et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2001). The powerful influence directly to bias action selection. There are heavy dopa-
minergic projections to neural targets thought to partici-of context has also been seen by Breiter and colleagues
Review
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Figure 6. Role of Temporal Predictability in
Human Brain Response to Changes in Expec-
tations
In Figure 5, both the time and character of
the next stimulus was changed between the
predictable and unpredictable sequences in
order to achieve maximal predictability and
unpredictability for the sequential stimuli that
we used.
(A) The basic strategy here is to break the
sequential stimulus into its component parts
and separate the influence of changes in tem-
poral expectations and stimulus expecta-
tions (what comes next).
(B) Passive task. Light cue is presented for 1
s followed 6 s later by a juice squirt. These
pairings are presented with randomized inter-
pair times (roughly 50 pairings per subject);
after this training, a similar run is carried out
containing six catch trials, where the juice is
delivered at an unexpected time (10 s). The
contrast to examine is between juice delivered at 10 s (unexpected) and juice delivered at 6 s (expected) (data not shown).
(C) Active task. Light cue is again presented and subject presses a button in free response (average time to press  1.5 s). During training,
juice is delivered exactly 4 s after button press. After training, catch trials (where juice delivery is delayed by 4 s) are again interspersed with normal
trials. Rather than show a single contrast image, we have plotted the average hemodynamic response during the active task (Figure 7).
pate in the sequencing and selection of motor action, prediction-error model, may participate directly in the
selection of actions that lead to reward. Below, we re-that is, the dorsal striatum. Disease states that perturb
dopamine levels (Parkinson’s disease) interfere cata- view the rationale for this hypothesis and its relationship
to behavioral and physiological experiments carried outstrophically with sequenced motor output. Single-unit
electrophysiology experiments in alert primates carrying in honeybees and humans.
Uncertainty in Immediate Rewardout behavioral tasks show that the learning displayed
by the dopamine circuit always occurs before measur- The prediction error interpretation of dopaminergic ac-
tivity works best in a perfect world where there is noable changes in the animals’ behavior (Hollerman and
Schultz, 1998). Lastly, from a computational perspec- uncertainty in the time or magnitude of future rewards.
In classical statistical estimation, uncertainty is definedtive, the prediction error signal is ideally suited to act
as a critic of actions that lead to immediate changes in as the estimated amount by which an observed or calcu-
lated value, Aˆ, may differ from the true value, A. Thisreward (see Dayan and Abbott, 2001; Dayan and Bal-
leine, 2002 [this issue of Neuron]). Taken as a whole, is typically computed as the square root of the mean
squared deviation from the true value,(AˆA)21/2, andthese diverse lines of evidence suggest that transient
changes in dopamine release, captured in part by the is accordingly called the estimation error. This notion
of uncertainty captures formally the idea that there is a
possible spread in the values that would be obtained
during an observation or within a finite sample. Hence,
uncertainty quantifies a kind of degree of ignorance
about a specific variable, and such ignorance always
possesses a cost. A real-world sensory cue that predicts
(estimates) the future time and magnitude of a reward
will have uncertainty associated with that estimation,
and that uncertainty has measurable costs to a mobile
creature. These costs influence the behavioral invest-
ments that an animal is willing to make with respect to
a reward predictor, and they influence the character of
the underlying neural computations that support such
behavioral choices. Above, we reviewed experiments
that addressed temporal uncertainty in reward delivery
in passive tasks, but here, we focus on uncertainty in
reward magnitude linked directly to actions.Figure 7. Average Hemodynamic Response during Active Temporal
Predictability Task Two-Choice Sequential Decision Tasks for Bees
Average BOLD response for normal trials and catch trials. Statisti- and Humans
cally significant difference between normal trial average and catch Uncertainty in reward magnitude has been tested be-
trial average was found at 10 s (p  0.0036) and 12 s (p  0.0489) haviorally in honeybees (Real, 1991) and provides a
after button press. Assuming a hemodynamic delay of 6 to 8 s, the starting point for connecting the prediction-error signal
curves diverge only at the time of the prediction error (adapted
to action selection. Honeybees possess octopaminergicfrom Pagnoni et al., 2002 [copyright 2002 by Nature Neuroscience,
neurons in their subesophogeal ganglion that are re-www.nature.com/neurosci). A similar divergence occurs in the pas-
sive task (data not shown; Sam McClure, personal communication). sponsible for reward-based learning in a fashion equiva-
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Figure 8. Using the Prediction as an Incen-
tive to Act
(A) Specific action selection model that uses a
reward prediction error to bias action choice.
Here, two actions, 1 and 2, are available to
the system, and in analogy with reward pre-
dictions learned for sensory cues (Figure 1
and 2), each action has an associated weight
that is modified using the prediction error sig-
nal according to the time-independent ver-
sion of a predictive Hebbian rule, the Re-
scorla-Wagner rule. As indicated, the weights
are used as a drive or incentive to take one
of the two available actions, which are chosen
using a probabilistic policy.
(B) Once an action is selected and an immediate reward received, the associated weight is updated according to the Rescorla-Wagner rule.
This setup can be used to model decisions made by both bees and humans on sequential decision-making tasks where the rewards are
respectively, nectar and money.
lent to that seen in the primate dopamine work (Hammer, of the reward prediction error: (1) learning–it is used to
update the current estimate (weight) of the value of a1993); that is, they too appear to encode reward predic-
tion errors in their spike output (Montague et al., 1994, behavioral choice, and (2) action choice–it is used as
the drive that biases action choice.1995). This prediction-error view of the octopaminergic
neurons has yielded insights into the computational Weights Can Be Used in Dual Roles: Reward
Predictions and Incentives to Actmechanisms that bees use to make decisions about
reward-yielding actions and has provided direction for For a sensory cue, the weight that develops in a pre-
dictive Hebbian rule (see legend, Figure 2) representsrelated work in humans.
Real and colleagues allowed honeybees to forage the future importance of that cue; hence, it encodes the
degree to which an animal should want to process theover an artificial field of flowers where flower color (blue
or yellow) was the only predictor of the nectar volumes cue. In situations where actions and their associated
cues are followed immediately by reward, the weight(see Real, 1991). This arrangement represents a sequen-
tial decision task where a reward follows immediately that develops encodes the animal’s willingness to take
the action again in the future when presented with theafter each selection: choose a flower color, land, acquire
nectar volume, and decide whether to switch or sample choice to do so. This willingness takes the form of a
probabilistic function, P, whose argument is the differ-the same color again. The question at hand was simple.
How do honeybees value uncertainty in reward magni- ence between the weights (Figure 8). In this sense, the
weight, when used to bias actions, encodes the animal’stude that follows a decision to sample one of the two
flower types? In the actual experiment, both flower types incentive to take a particular action. These ideas show
that for the limited cases considered here, our dual useyielded the same mean reward (2 	l of nectar). Initially,
all of the blue flowers gave 2 	l of nectar, while 1/3 of of the prediction-error signal appears to take account, in
a quantitative form, of psychological ideas like incentiveyellow flowers gave 6 	l of nectar and the remaining 2/3
yielded 0 	l. Both colors predicted a mean return of 2 salience (Berridge and Robinson, 1998).
As shown in Figure 9, the model matches the observed	l, but as a predictor of nectar volume, yellow had high
variance (yielding many failures) and blue had zero vari- bee behavior quite well and suggests a substrate for
how honeybees may compute and value the averageance. The bees were quite risk averse and chose blue
flowers on greater than 80% of their flower visits. As a uncertainty (variance in returns) associated with a re-
ward predictor (flower color). Accordingly, the modelbehavioral result, this finding agrees with the way that
humans behave: they act to avoid uncertainty in reward suggests a physiological substrate and computational
mechanism underlying risk aversion in bees.magnitude.
Connecting the Reward Prediction-Error Signal Connecting the Reward Prediction-Error Signal
to Action Selection (Human)to Action Selection (Bee)
It has been shown that reward predictor neurons in the Inspired by this work in bees and the analogy with the
dopamine-based reward prediction error, Egelman etbee (the octopaminergic neurons) can be used directly
in an action-selection model to generate the same deci- al. (1998) used a modification of both the experimental
task and the bee model to query risk aversion in humansion-making behavior observed in the real bees (Figure
8; Montague et al., 1995). Specifically, the reward predic- subjects. They used the same behavioral arrangement,
that is, a two-choice behavioral task with immediatetion error is used to bias action selection through a
probabilistic policy where the likelihood of selecting yel- rewards following each choice (Figure 10). Instead of
nectar volumes, monetary returns were used. In contrastlow (PY) is a function of the synaptic weight (WY) associ-
ated with yellow; likewise for blue. The weights are ad- with the bee experiment, instead of associating each
choice with a fixed average uncertainty (variance) injusted using the same reward prediction error signal as
indicated in Figure 8. Through learning, the weights WY reward, changes in reward for each choice were made
into continuous functions of the history of choices made.and WB come to represent the current estimate of the
average reward expected for choosing yellow (Y) or blue The predicted behavior of the bee model guided the
design of the reward functions (Figure 11). Specifically,(B), respectively. This model shows clearly the dual use
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Figure 9. Prediction-Error Model of Sequential Decision Making in
Bees
Honeybees were allowed to forage over an artificial field of blue
and yellow flowers where the only predictor of reward was flower
color (yellow or blue). Both flower types yielded the same mean
reward (2 	l of nectar). Initially, all the blue flowers gave 2 	l of
Figure 10. Sequential Decision-Making Task for Humansnectar, while 1/3 of yellow flowers gave 6 	l and the remaining 2/3
A two-choice, decision-making task given to human subjects andyielded 0 	l. That is, both colors predicted a mean return of 2 	l,
a prediction error-based action model (Figure 8). Two buttons ap-but as a predictor of nectar volume, yellow had high variance (yield-
pear on a computer screen with a centrally placed slider bar, whiching many failures) and blue had zero variance. Bees possess octo-
indicates the magnitude of the immediate return after each selection.paminergic neurons whose spike production is consistent with a
The slider stays at its last height until the next selection is made;reward prediction error signal and whose output is necessary for
that is, there is no memory requirement to execute the task. Asreward-dependent learning in the bee.
indicated, the subject makes a choice, the slider bar changes its(A) Using this prediction-error signal in a computational model of
height from its last position, and the subject must choose to stayaction choice (model described in Figure 8), a model bee (black line)
with current choice or switch to the other alternative. The subjectsis shown to avoid the risky yellow flowers at the same rate as normal
are told that: “each choice, A or B, results in a reward, which willbees when the learning rate is high (see Montague et al., 1994, 1995;
be shown as a change in the slider bar height. Higher is more, lowerFigure 8). For both real bees and model bees, the fraction of visits
is less. Try to make as much as you can by making choices thatto blue is an average over 40 flower visits. At trial 15, the statistics
keep the slider bar high. There are no time limits; the computer willof nectar return for each flower color were switched so that yellow
stop the task when it is complete.”predicted zero variance in nectar returns (no uncertainty in magni-
The task was designed based on the success with the bee modeltude) and blue became the variable predictor. Real bees switch in
but with one major difference. In the bee experiment and model, theabout three to five flower visits and at the high learning rate chosen
tested parameter was the average uncertainty (variance) in reward(  0.95 for the learning rule in Figure 8B); the model bees also
magnitude associated with each of two choices (blue flower orswitch their preference in approximately the same number of visits.
yellow flower). Just as in the bee experiments, the monetary rewardThese results show that real bees are averse to uncertainty in future
(change in slider bar height) was delivered immediately after eachreward magnitudes and can quickly learn to avoid risky flowers, that
action. The difference in the human experiment is that the uncer-is, flowers that yield highly variable returns. The model shows how
tainty in the reward magnitude was made to be a continuous functionthe prediction error signal available to the bee brain and generated
of the fractional allocation to button A (see Figure 11). The fractionalby its octopaminergic neurons can be used to guide such behavior.
allocation of choices to button A was computed as an average over(B) Representative reward sequences for a series of samples from
the last 20 selections. It should be noted that the results reportedeach flower type.
below do not change if this window is extended to the last 40
selections.
the reward functions were built to trap the dynamics of
the model in specific decision strategies.
There are three valuable outcomes of this approach. choosing B for a particular fractional allocation to button
A. If A is chosen, the fractional allocation to A increases,(1) It connects the prediction-error model of single-unit
activity to biases in action choice without committing and the subject is moved rightward on the horizontal
axis. If B is chosen, the fractional allocation to A de-to any behavioral model of sequential decision-making
strategies. (2) The action choice model makes quantita- creases, and the subject is moved leftward on the hori-
zontal axis. Notice the reward functions for the matchingtive predictions of how humans should perform under
complex reward structures, if their actions are biased shoulders task (Figure 11). As the allocation to A in-
creases, the subject is moved rightward on the hori-primarily by a dopamine prediction error signal. (3) The
model provides insight into one possible neural sub- zontal axis, and the reward for choosing A goes down.
Consequently, choosing B increases the reward andstrate of matching behavior (Herrnstein, 1990; see
below). moves the subject leftward back toward the crossing
point. However, if B continues to be selected, the subjectOne particular design feature of the reward functions
deserves comment. If learning rates are set appropri- moves left of the crossing point and the reward de-
creases for continued selections to B. Consequently,ately, the action-selection model (Figure 8) will adjust
its weights in a manner that forces it to make allocations switching to A increases the reward and again moves
the subject rightward back toward the crossing point.to each choice (button A or button B) that place it near
crossing points in the reward functions. This attraction Human Behavior on the Sequential Decision-
Making Tasksfor the crossing point can be thought of as a kind of
value illusion (see Appendix B). This predilection for On the matching shoulders task (Figure 11), the optimal
allocation to button A and the crossing point in thecrossing points can also be understood intuitively. In
Figure 11, the red line shows the reward obtained for reward functions coincide. In this plot, each closed,
green circle represents a single subject, the horizontalchoosing A and the blue line shows the reward for
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Figure 11. Using a Prediction-Error Signal to
Make Economic Choices
The return (height of slider bar) for each
choice is a function of the fraction of choices
previously allocated to choice A (over the last
20 choices). The subjects do not know this
fact and must learn how to act by making
choices and receiving immediate returns. At
each fractional allocation, f, to choice A, the
red line gives the return (height of bar) for
choosing A next, and the blue line gives the
return for choosing B next. The dashed line
in each panel represents the optimal curve, that is, the best that could be earned on average if the subject played at a fixed allocation to
button A for the entire task. Each task consisted of 250 selections, but the subjects were not told this beforehand nor did they have knowledge
of these reward functions.
Each subject was started with a fractional allocation to button of 0.5. This starting point was assigned stochastically, providing some wobble
in the exact starting point. This effect can be seen in Figure 12. Other initial conditions were tried and the overall results did not change (data
not shown). The reward functions still separated the subjects into at least two distinct groups. The prediction-error model of action choice
(Figure 8) experiences a kind of “value illusion,” which expresses itself as a strong tendency to play at crossing points in the reward functions
(explained in Appendix B). The overall consequence of this value illusion is that the model will give up better long-term returns to stay near
crossing points.
Matching shoulders task. Here, the optimal curve (dashed line) and the crossing point in the reward functions coincide (explained in Appendix
B). Rising optimum task. The optimal solution is to choose A every time; hence, the optimal curve is an almost monotonically increasing
function of the allocation to A. In both panels, each green dot is a single subject; its horizontal position encodes the average allocation to A
over 250 selections, and its vertical height encodes the average return per selection earned over the 250 selections. Subjects’ equilibrium
behavior in the matching shoulders task is nearly optimal, a fact likely to be an artifact of the coincidence of the maximum of the optimal
curve and the crossing point in the reward functions. In the rising optimum task, subjects’ equilibrium behavior separates them into two
distinct groups: conservative (stick near crossing point) and risky (nearly optimize). The black arrowhead indicates the fractional allocation
to A that defines the two groups: less than 0.5 allocation to A (conservatives) and greater than 0.5 allocation to A (risky). The gray bar shows
the separation of these two groups based on their equilibrium allocations to choice A. This separation into two groups is not merely an
equilibrium behavior but is also reflected by detailed choice dynamics on the rising optimum task (see Figure 12).
coordinate encodes the average fractional allocation to ure 12, these two groups are vastly different in their
choice-by-choice dynamics. In this figure, each point isbutton A over the entire task, and the vertical component
encodes the average reward received per choice. Ex- a mean over subjects or instances of the model, and
the error bars are the standard errors of the means.cept for a few outliers, all subjects choose on average
to stay near the crossing point in the reward functions. The difference in these two groups is also evident
in a switching task where the subject begins with theThe model plays almost exactly at the crossing point
(data not shown). This is an adaptation of a task used matching shoulders reward functions, which are then
secretly switched to the rising optimum reward func-by Herrnstein to address rational choice theory and
matching law behavior (Herrnstein, 1990). Here, we see tions midway through the task (selection 125). Figure
12B shows the behavior of these two groups on suchthat the matching law behavior emerges near crossing
points from the bias in action selection imposed by the a switching task. Each group is categorized by their
equilibrium behavior on the rising optimum task andprediction-error signal. The apparent optimality of this
matching strategy near the crossing point of the match- later brought back to perform the switching task. Al-
though none of the subjects are informed of the initialing shoulders task is most likely an artifact of the specific
ratio chosen for the slopes of the linear reward functions reward functions or the switch, only the subjects catego-
rized as risky sense the switch in reward functions andand is not evidence that all the humans are acting opti-
mally. respond by changing their fractional allocation to button
A. As shown, the model anticipates well the behavior ofIn the rising optimum task, the optimal curve (dashed
black line) is a nearly monotonic increasing function of the conservative subjects.
Taken together, the equilibrium behavior and thethe subjects’ allocation to button A. As with the matching
shoulders task, there is a crossing point in the reward choice-by-choice dynamics show that the two catego-
ries of subjects is a real, measurable distinction. It’sfunctions, and this crossing point is aligned at the same
fractional allocation to button A (0.32). As before, each clear that both groups can sense the crossing point in
the reward function; both risky and conservative areclosed, green circle is a single subject. These reward
functions separating the subjects fall neatly into two capable of playing at the crossing point in the matching
shoulders task. However, the rising optimum task expo-groups, which we have labeled risky and conservative
(Figure 11). The conservatives play just as predicted by ses their apparent differential sensitivity to decreases
in returns. In this task, as the crossing point is passedthe model–just to the right of the crossing point in the
reward functions (Appendix B). However, the model did from left to right (as allocation to A increases), there is
a dip in the return received from choosing button A. Innot anticipate the behavior of the risky subjects who
express a nearly optimal selection strategy. These re- the simplest case, if the past models the future, then
such a dip might well be interpreted by some neuralsults would be unremarkable if the groups differed only
in their equilibrium behavior; however, as shown in Fig- mechanism as increased risk for continued selections to
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Figure 12. Choice Dynamics Also Distin-
guish Conservative and Risky Subjects
Subjects were categorized as conservative
or risky based on their equilibrium behavior
on the rising optimum task illustrated in Fig-
ure 11. Here, we plot the choice-by-choice
dynamics on the rising optimum task (A) and
on a switching task (B) where reward func-
tions starting as matching shoulders were se-
cretly switched to rising optimum after selec-
tion number 125.
(A) Choice dynamics on rising optimum task.
Fractional allocation to choice A versus raw
selection number. Three traces are shown for
the first 100 choices on the rising optimum
task: (1) conservative human subjects (less
than 0.5 average allocation to A on the rising
optimum task; blue), (2) risky human subjects
(greater than 0.5 average allocation to A on
the rising optimum task; magenta), and (3)
dopamine prediction-error choice model
(Figure 8;   0.93; red). At each selection
number, the central point is the mean, and
the error bars represent the standard error of
the means. Notice that by 25–30 selections,
the two groups are separated and remain so.
The model is stable near the crossing points
and plays like the conservative human sub-
jects. (humans, n  42; model, n  21).
(B) Switching task for humans. In the bee decision task, the average uncertainty in reward magnitude for blue and yellow were switched. Both
real bees and the model bee switched their behavioral allocations in response to this switch (Figure 9). In this switching task, the rewards
functions began as matching shoulders and were switched to rising optimum at trial 125. The risky and conservative subjects behave differently
after the switch. The risky subjects sense the switch and change their allocation strategy to near optimal while the conservative subjects
continue to choose A in a fashion that keeps them near the crossing point in the reward functions. Likewise, the model also chooses to stay
near the crossing point in the reward functions. These results show that the risky subjects are capable of playing at the crossing point when
this is optimal, but unlike the conservative subjects, they sense and respond readily to unanticipated changes in reward structure.
A. The willingness to play through the dip and continue in humans produced a sequential behavioral task that
separated subjects into two groups. These groups couldexploring is one feature that characterizes the capacity
of the risky group to discover the nearly optimal strategy. be characterized by their brain response to changes in
predictability for sequential gustatory stimuli and byHowever, this is not a complete explanation since indi-
vidual conservatives often displayed large excursions their dynamic and equilibrium performance on a simple
two-choice behavioral task (rising optimum). Altogether,into the optimal allocation to A range but after a few
selections were driven back toward the crossing point. the constellation of results reviewed above suggested
to us and others (O’Doherty et al., 2001) that a morePossible Linkage between Brain Response
to Predictability Changes and Riskiness general function than simple expectation violation was
being carried out by the ventral striatum, dorsal striatum,The tight connection of the reward prediction error and
the action-selection mechanism suggested to us that and orbitofrontal circuit (OFS circuit). We strongly sus-
pected the existence of a more generalized valuationthere might be a connection between the subjects’ ex-
pressed risk profile on the rising optimum task and their function.
We propose that the OFS circuit computes an ongoingbrain response to changes in predictability for the se-
quential gustatory stimulus. We had no expectation valuation of potential payoffs (including rewards),
losses, and their proxies (predictors) across a broadabout the polarity of such a relationship. Remarkably,
a regionally specific difference in brain response to domain of stimuli. This is a different proposal from the
prediction-error signal discussed above for midbrainchanges in predictability paralleled these behaviorally
defined labels. This difference can be seen by correlat- dopamine neurons (Montague and Sejnowski, 1994;
Montague et al., 1996) and proposed for many othering the allocation to choice A and the brain response
to changes in predictability for the sequential gustatory brain regions (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000). The predic-
tion error signal guides the system to learn the time andexperiment described above (Figure 5). This analysis
showed that the response of the left nucleus accumbens amount of future rewards, and may, as reviewed above,
direct some forms of simple decision-making. Our spe-to changes in predictability correlates strongly with risky
behavior on the rising optimum task (Figure 13; n  14; cific proposal for one function of the OFS is that it com-
putes a valuation of rewards, punishments, and theirp  0.0005).
Orbitofrontal-Striatal (OFS) Circuit predictors. By providing a common valuation scale for
diverse stimuli, this system emits a signal useful foras a Valuation System
To summarize, a prediction error-based model of how comparing and contrasting the value of future events
that have not yet happened–a signal required for deci-reward expectancy should influence decision-making
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ciently. The most interesting connection to neural sys-
tems is the idea of a currency.
A currency is an abstract way to represent the value
of a good or service. For our purposes in this paper, it
possesses an important property: it provides a common
scale to value fundamentally incommensurable stimuli
and behavioral acts. For example, suppose we want to
understand the relative value of 17 coconuts and 41
sips of water. There is no natural way to combine coco-
nuts and sips of water; however, each can be converted
to their valuation in some currency, and the values can
be combined in any number of ways. This kind of ab-
straction is so common in our everyday world that its
biological substrates go virtually unnoticed.
Without internal currencies in the nervous system, a
creature would be unable to assess the relative value
of different events like drinking water, smelling food,
scanning for predators, sitting quietly in the sun, and so
forth. To decide on an appropriate behavior, the nervous
system must estimate the value of each of these poten-
tial actions, convert it to a common scale, and use this
Figure 13. Multiplying Two Experiments: Brain Response that Cor- scale to determine a course of action. This idea of a
relates with Risky Choices common scale can also be used to value both predictors
The optimum strategy in the rising optimum task (Figure 11) is to and rewards.
choose A every time; a strategy pursued by half the subjects. This Cost of Believing and Acting on a Predictor
strategy represents risk-taking because a subject must endure a
A predictor of future reward acts as a promise to thedecrease in the returns from A in order to discover the domain of
nervous system that a certain amount of reward will bemaximal returns (Figure 11; notice the dip in A’s reward function
delivered at a specified future time. In the models thatjust to the right of the crossing point). As demonstrated by their
different choice-by-choice dynamics, the risky and conservative we have reviewed above, only the amount and time of
subjects were different from the very start of the task, suggesting the reward were important for driving learning. However,
the hypothesis that their brain response to changes in predictability a behavioral act or fixed amount of some rewarding
might also differ (Figure 12). Consequently, we tested the hypothesis substance does not possess a fixed value to the organ-
that there would be a correlation between fractional allocation to A
ism; rather, the value of a reward can change dramati-(higher  riskier) and brain response to changes in predictability for
cally as new, unexpected information arrives. Supposesequential gustatory stimuli.
that a red light predicted 10 ml of water 1 min in the(A) Brain response in nucleus accumbens (left and right, separately)
versus assignment to conservative or risky groups based on perfor- future. If everything goes as expected, then 1 min after
mance on rising optimum task (Figure 11). In the left nucleus accum- the light the system can expect 10 ml of water–the sys-
bens, the risky group was significantly different from the conserva- tem can plan actions accordingly. However, suppose
tive group, as indicated by the asterisk (p  0.0005).
that 5 ml is unexpectedly delivered 30 s after the red(B) Brain response in left nucleus accumbens versus fractional allo-
light and suppose that this is a rare event, not somethingcation to choice A (n  14). Each point is a subject.
that will systematically happen in the future. What hap-
pens to the value of the red light as a predictor of 10
ml of water? Surely, the value of the 10 ml is less becausesion-making algorithms that assign attention, plan ac-
of this unexpected event. Should the same actions con-tions, and compare disparate stimuli (see O’Doherty et
tinue to be planned for 1 min based on the red light?al., 2001). Below, we consider generally how this working
Should the decreased value of the reward also cause ahypothesis can be converted into quantitative predic-
decrease in the value of the predictor for that reward?tions of neural signals that participate in ongoing valu-
To value a predictor, a neural system must have aation.
way to compute the predictor’s value before the reward
that it promises actually arrives. One difficulty with this
The Predictor-Valuation Model proposition derives from the uncertainty associated with
Common Scales through Internal Currencies the time interval extending from predictor onset to the
Any economic system possesses three basic real-world expected future time of reward delivery. However, this
features: (1) markets–goods and services desired by uncertainty must be handled correctly because predic-
consumers, (2) currency–some way to represent the tions about future reward represent a real cost to the
value of goods and services, and (3) limited resources. creature. Believing a predictor means that processing
In biology, the markets for most creatures are pretty time is tied up and behavioral resources committed as
clear. Creatures must obtain adequate food and rest in actions are prepared. In a system with finite processing
order to acquire the most important resource–mates, capacity, finite resources for planning potential actions,
and hence, offspring. The idea of limited resources is and finite resources for output behaviors, the continued
also a clear constraint in the biological world. Creatures belief in the promise of a predictor is a potentially costly
that take an excessive amount of time or effort acquiring commitment. It follows that there must exist neural sig-
food, mates, and safety will be less successful than nals that provide an ongoing valuation of both predictors
and potential future rewards. Below, we develop a sim-creatures that carry out these functions quickly and effi-
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ple model of such valuation, and show how it may actu-
ally be represented at the single cell level as changes
in spike production that occur prior to the arrival of a
predicted rewarding stimulus. This model should apply
equally well to both rewards and punishments; however,
for convenience we refer only to predictors of reward.
Diffuse and Discount Strategy Produces
Predictor-Valuation Model
Any valuation scheme for reward predictors must take
account of two important principles. Principle 1: any
estimate of future reward is not exact. Uncertainty ac-
crues with time and more uncertainty will accumulate
for reward estimates in the distant future than for those
in the near future. Principle 2: there is risk associated
with the future time that separates the predictor from Figure 14. Uncertainty-Adjusted Reward Estimate
future reward; therefore, there must be some dis- Example of how the uncertainty-adjusted estimate of future reward
ranks identical rewards that arrive at evenly spaced times to thecounting of time.
future of n (perceptual now). The solid black trace is a plot of theThe two principles are meant to distinguish two differ-
initial reward estimate rˆ(x), composed of three Gaussian fluctuationsent effects. (1) A dynamical estimate of the future is
expected to arrive at different, but evenly spaced, future times. Asnot exact. As time passes, the uncertainty (error) in the
an example, the trace could represent the amount of water delivered
estimate will accumulate. (2) The value to most creatures as a function of time. In this case, the Gaussian fluctuations are
of a fixed return diminishes as a function of the time to squirts of water. Each peak has a standard deviation of 0.05 s. Using
payoff, that is, the time from now until the reward arrives. this initial estimate, the uncertainty-adjusted reward estimate Rˆ(x,n;
D) is shown as a solid red trace (equation 1; D  1/10, n  0). TwoTwo examples below may help illustrate these prin-
features are evident. (1) The uncertainty in the reward estimate isciples.
seen to increase with increasing time in the future. (2) The amplitudePrinciple (1) example: I build a dynamical model of
of Rˆ(x,n; D) diminishes with increasing time. The uncertainty accrues
weather. My prediction 2 days hence is more certain at a rate proportional to the time it will take to reach each future
than my prediction 10 days hence because error in my point starting at perceptual time n. This representation captures the
initial estimate builds up with time. The only question requirements of principle 1 (text), that the distant future will add
more uncertainty than the near future. Simulated curve courtesy ofnow is the nature of the model that captures quantita-
Dr. Phillip Baldwin (unpublished data).tively the build-up in uncertainty. Below, we choose a
simple diffusion approach to the accumulation of uncer-
tainty in future reward.
it will not be exact. Now we implement principle 1 fromPrinciple (2) example: “I’ll give you $100 in 1 min or
above, that is, more time before experiencing a prom-$100 in 1 year.” Which do you take? The answer for
ised fluctuation in reward means more uncertainty inmost humans is clear, and we have established the rela-
the estimate of that fluctuation. We capture this formallytive value of the two choices based only on a difference
by letting the estimate rˆ(x) diffuse, but differentially asin the promised time of delivery. The only issue now is
a function of the time it would take from time n (‘now’)the value of the time to reward. Just as the bee’s valua-
to reach the future time x. This maneuver generates ation of reward variability can be measured behaviorally,
new uncertainty-adjusted estimate Rˆ(x,n) that hasthe human can likewise be queried. $100 in 1 min or
scaled the uncertainty in the reward associated with$1000 in 1 year, $100 in 1 min or $10,000 in 1 year, $100
in 1 min or $100,000 in 1 year, $100 in 1 min or $1,000,000 future times according to the time it will take to reach
in 1 year, and so on. We could arrive at a person’s those future times:
valuation of 1 year (scaling factor and offset) quite
Rˆ(x,n; D)  
∞
∞
dy G(x  y,(x  n)D)rˆ (y), (1)quickly.
Diffusing the Reward Estimate
where G(z,b) (2
b)1/2 exp{z2/2b} and D is a constant.The first point to make is to reemphasize that the valua-
The dependence of the diffusion on the time to reachtion of a reward predictor is in units of the value of future
a future reward can be seen by delivering three equal-predicted reward and is not simply related to the amount
sized fluctuations in reward at evenly spaced times toof future reward. As indicated in Figure 14, n is percep-
the future of n (Figure 14). For example, these fluctua-tual or experiential time, that is, the animal’s internal
tions could represent water squirts in the mouth of aindex for the present (now). Let S(rˆ(x)) be the value of
thirsty creature; that is, the vertical axis would representthe estimated reward rˆ(x) defined for time x. In this paper,
volume of water. These fluctuations were Gaussian andwe simply assume that value S(rˆ(x)) is proportional to
had a width (standard deviation) of 0.05 s. There arerˆ(x), and leave our development in terms of rˆ(x). Assume
two main effects to notice in the uncertainty-adjustedthat some sensory cue, which has formerly acted as a
estimate Rˆ(x,n; D) (red trace) of the initial reward esti-reward predictor, is experienced at perceptual time n.
mate rˆ(x) (black trace). (1) The uncertainty grows withThis cue is associated with a stored estimate of the
distance into the future, and (2) the amplitude necessar-likely reward for all time (future and past of n). In this
ily decreases.sense, the cue evokes a function that expresses what
Discounting the Futurelikely has happened (past of n) and what will likely hap-
The development above imposed a simple model forpen (future of n).
Since rˆ(x) is an estimate of the true reward function, how uncertainties in reward fluctuations accrue as a
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function of the time that will elapse before the promised Predictor-Valuation Model
We can now combine the diffuse and discount stepsfluctuations are experienced. In our case, we allowed
the stored estimate rˆ(x) (from memory) to diffuse differ- described above. The diffusion part captured the fact
that less uncertainty will accrue with less time to waitentially as indicated in equation 1. This adjusts our
model of future reward to account for principle 1. Once into the future. The discounting argument showed that
the system can easily accomplish exponential dis-our new uncertainty-adjusted estimate Rˆ(x,n; D) is gen-
erated, the system must now assign a value to the ex- counting if it simply monitors a signal that tells it the
highest value of immediately available rewards. The dif-pected reward for all times to the future of n. We must
choose a way to discount the value of the expected fusion part produced a new uncertainty-adjusted esti-
mate, Rˆ(x,n), of reward that should be discounted expo-reward at future times.
There is no global time discount rate in the brain; nentially through time according to the time it will take
to reach each point in time x to the future of the presenthowever, one can make a reasonable argument that
exponentially discounting the future is a straightforward experienced time n, and all of these contributions from
the future must be added up to produce the currentidea that could be implemented locally through time.
The basic idea is to treat the reward predictor as some- value F(n) of the predictor at perceptual time n:







dy G(x  y, (x  n)D) rˆ(y)each small instant, whether it is worth continued pro-




dx {eq(xn)} · {Rˆ(x,n; D)}be made with an example.




dx {discount future time x relative to perceptual time n} ·
impulse of reward at some relatively long time, t*, to the
future of n. During a small time step to the future of n,
{diffused version of reward estimate rˆ(x) for same x and n} (3)
a reward more immediately valuable than the reward
promised by the predictor may present itself. In order This integral equation is the predictor-valuation model
to know whether to continue processing the current and expresses the value of a predictor as a function of
predictor-reward pair, the system must be able to value current perceptual time n. It can also be expressed as
the predictor before its expected reward arrives. This a differential equation that produces a number of inter-
perspective suggests a simple strategy for valuing a esting solutions related to current electrophysiological
predictor: if the current value of the predictor is greater experiments on reward prediction and valuation (Mon-
than the value of what could otherwise be gained imme- tague and Baldwin, unpublished data).
diately, then stay with processing the predictor, other- Neural Economics: Applying the Predictor-
wise switch to processing the immediate return. Switch- Valuation Model to Neural Data
ing to the more valuable immediate return means that The stay or switch argument above results in a scheme
the system forgoes the expected future return promised for continuously deciding whether the current value of
by the predictor. This strategy translates directly into a a predictor is worth continued processing (investment).
method to value the predictor during the time interval For reward prediction, the predictor-valuation model
between its onset at any time, n, and reward delivery at predicts an escalating increase in some signal up until
some later time, t*. Divide the interval t* n into N equal the time of significant future fluctuations in reward. Near
intervals of size t  (t*  n)/N. Let q be the probability the perceptual present, this escalation should be ap-
per unit time that an event occurs in t that is more proximately exponential, especially in simple experi-
valuable than the current value of the predictor (which mental scenarios. Near the time of future reward deliv-
we have not yet specified). Now implement the strategy ery, the shape of the function is more complicated
above. The system should stay with processing the pre- because it depends on the exact reward estimate, the
dictor if no event occurs in the first time interval, t1, value of D, and time to reach the future point. The model
that is more valuable than the current value of the pre- generates a fairly rich set of predictions given its simple
dictor. The probability that no such event occurs during diffuse and discount derivation. As described below, it
t1 is 1 minus the probability that it does occur, that is, may indeed provide insight into neural responses mea-
1  qt1. The probability of staying with the predictor sured in prefrontal cortex and dorsal striatum and may
through the entire interval is the probability that no such also provide a biological substrate, or rather justifica-
event occurs in all N subintervals: tion, for economic models for the valuation of market
options (Montague and Baldwin, unpublished data).
Pstay(N)  Prob. that event doesnot occur in t1  · 
Prob. that event does
not occur in t2
 ··· Our working hypothesis, as expressed above based
on fMRI data, is that the orbitofrontal cortex and striatum
are the likely sites to participate in such an importantProb. that event doesnot occur in tN  valuation function. The measured single-unit responses
to reward processing in orbitofrontal cortex are ex- (1  qt1)(1  qt2) ··· (1  qtN)
tremely heterogeneous. Some neurons respond only to
 (1  qt)N reward-predicting cues and others only to delivery of
liquid or food reward (Schultz et al., 2000). Nevertheless,
 (1  q(t*  n)N1)N. (2)
there is one major class of neural response anticipated
very well by the predictor-valuation model describedIn the limit of large N, Pstay becomes eq(t*n), the probabil-
above. Figure 15B shows the response of a neuron fromity that nothing more valuable arrived during the interval
between predictor and expected reward at time t*. orbitofrontal cortex in an alert primate during the period
Review
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Figure 15. Escalating Activity Increase dur-
ing Delay Period
(A) Spatial delayed-response task given to
alert monkeys. Monkey holds down a press
key and is presented with a control screen for
2 s, after which an instruction screen delivers
two pieces of information: (1) which lever to
press (right or left) on subsequent trigger
stimulus and (2) which reward could be ex-
pected. Second delay is 2.5–3.5 s. Trigger:
two identical squares are presented, monkey
releases press key and selects (if correct) the
right or left lever (black triangle), as indicated
by the instruction.
(B) Changes in amplitude of exponential
build-up during delay period depend on the
relative value of the terminal reward. Activity
in a single orbitofrontal neuron during spatial
delayed response task where reward is a
piece of apple, but the apple is presented in
two separate contexts. In context one, the two possible rewards are cereal and apple, and in context two, they are raisin and apple. Similar
to (B), both contexts produce an escalating increase in activity during the period from instruction to reward, but when apple is the more
preferred reward (context one; apple versus cereal), the amplitude of this increase is larger than when apple is the less preferred reward
(context two; apple versus raisin).
The influence of this change in valuation of the reward could be expressed in the prediction valuation model either through changes in q,
changes in the function, S, that values the reward, r, or in some combination of variables on which F depends (equation 3 in text). The red
line is a fit of the predictor-valuation model to the spike rate histogram. Fits courtesy of Dr. Phillip Baldwin (unpublished data) (adapted from
Tremblay and Schultz, 1999 [copyright 1999 by Nature, www.nature.com]).
between an instruction cue and the subsequent delivery predictor throughout the trial and up until the time of
actual reward delivery.of reward at the time indicated. The animal was carrying
out a spatial delayed-response task (Figure 15A) in
which an instruction cue is illuminated and delivers two Discussion
We have reviewed neuroimaging, neurophysiological,pieces of information: (1) which of two targets the animal
should select (right or left) and (2) which reward will be and behavioral data and their correlations with respect
to both reward and valuation. Together, these resultsdelivered for a correct response. In the figure, two traces
are shown for the same neuron. These traces illustrate suggest that the OFS circuits act to generate a common
internal currency (scale) for the valuation of payoffs,the relative difference in the neuronal response to the
same reward (apple) but in comparison to other rewards losses, and their proxies (predictors of payoffs and
losses; see O’Doherty et al., 2001). Our focus was narrow(raisin, cereal). In behavioral assays, the animal’s prefer-
ence was raisin apple cereal. The response in Figure and primarily neural, using behavioral evidence primarily
to emphasize the neural responses on which our review15B (top) is for apple versus cereal, but the same stimu-
lus (apple) causes a smaller overall response during the concentrated. We showed that these qualitative obser-
vations may be upgraded to a quantitative biologicaldelay period for apple versus raisin ([B], bottom). In both
cases, the increase in activity occurs in an exponential model of reward predictor valuation. The two fundamen-
tal components of this model were: (1) diffusion in timefashion throughout the trial and decays back to baseline
(at a different rate) from the time of reward delivery. The to account for future uncertainty and (2) discounting in
time to allow for the possibility that better alternativesfigure legend discusses a possible substrate for this
change using the predictor valuation model. may intervene in the future. Through this model, we
were able to account in detail for the functional formNotice the increase in spike production beginning
somewhere near the instruction and increasing (roughly) of electrophysiological activity in orbitofrontal. We now
discuss the connection of the predictor-valuation modelexponentially up to the time of reward, after which it
decays back to baseline levels. In addition, there are to both behavior and finance.
Neurons or Behavior?different time constants for the activity build-up up to
reward delivery and the decay after reward delivery. The The predictor valuation model, while inspired by eco-
nomic ideas, is meant to explain the response of a spe-solution to the predictor-valuation model (equation 3
above; red lines in Figure 15B) anticipates both the expo- cific set of circuits in the brain–the OFS. Indeed, we
showed that the model anticipates the functional formnential build-up and the different time constants (the fit
to these data was generously provided by Dr. Phillip of neural activity in the OFS during delay periods, sepa-
rating reward-predictors and their promised rewards.Baldwin as a personal communication).
The escalating response is remarkable for a cortical Economists, however, are interested in understanding
the behavior of people (microeconomics) or marketspyramidal neuron, which is well known to show strong
spike rate adaptation to inputs. It is not a trivial biophysi- (macroeconomics). A question naturally arises: How are
the neural data and economic constructs connected?cal or circuit level task to make the neuron produce
spikes in this escalating fashion. In our view, it is this The notion of framing economic behavior in terms of
conflicting behavioral tendencies within an individual isbasic trend that may well represent the valuation of the
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not new (Ainslie, 1992). Here, we are proposing a simple utility posited a decaying exponential relationship be-
tween delay and value, but subsequent experiments inscaling principle. Economies are composed of people
acting according to their internal valuation of events, both pigeons (Mazur, 1988) and humans (Lowenstein
and Prelec, 1992) suggested that this relationship isgoods, services, and so forth. The argument is simple:
a model of neuronal valuation in individuals should have more concave than an exponential, possibly hyperbolic.
To our knowledge, no biological explanation for thisexplanatory power at both the micro- and macroeco-
nomic level and especially in narrowly defined markets. relationship in terms of identified neural circuits has
been offered. Evolving the concept of reward into oneReward versus Valuation
We have made a critical distinction between the con- of valuation, however, offers one explanation for such
apparently “irrational” behavior. From first principles,cepts of reward and valuation. Reward refers to the
actual stimulus, be it food, money, drugs, etc., but as the two-step diffuse-and-discount formulation leads to
an overall discounting that is faster than a single expo-noted earlier, there is no straightforward way to equate
these very different entities. Similarly, the types of stimuli nential and will lead to the same choice reversals that
have been observed across a variety of species.that predict reward may also take on vastly different
forms. Both neurophysiological and brain imaging data Diffuse and Discount Produces a Connection
to the Black-Scholes Equationstrongly implicate the OFS as a common pathway for the
representation of both rewards and predictors. Indeed, The predictor-valuation model was derived above by
imposing a diffusion model of how to adjust the initialeven faces of attractive women can activate this circuit
(Aharon et al., 2001), as well as nonrewarding events reward estimate rˆ(x) by the uncertainty that will accrue
in the future. The value of the new, uncertainty-adjustedlike noxious thermal stimuli (Becerra et al., 2001). If all
these different stimuli evoke activity in the OFS, then estimate Rˆ(x,n), was then exponentially discounted
backward through time to psychological now (n ). Thiswhat is the nature of the representation? As proposed
here, we believe it to be value. The notion of value is exponential discounting was based on the idea that pro-
cessing the predictor consumes system resources, and itswell known to economists–for example, a guaranteed
$10 today is more valuable than $10 promised for 5 processing should therefore be continuously reevaluated.
These two components produced the predictor-valua-years from now. Indeed, this example illustrates one
form of valuation–discounting, but this is only one as- tion model, which anticipated several important features
of single-unit responses from orbitofrontal cortex andpect of the model proposed here. In addition to dis-
counting, one needs both a common currency and an dorsal striatum. Detailed experimental tests of this
model await future work. However, it should be notedaccounting for uncertainty associated with the future.
By converting into such a currency, the value of reading that the predictor-valuation model has a remarkable re-
lationship to economic theories (Black and Scholes,a book can be weighed against working a few more
hours. Both have very different “rewards,” but con- 1973) that seek to value hedged portfolios in an efficient
marketplace (Montague and Baldwin, unpublished data).verting them to a common valuation scale allows them to
be compared. The data reviewed here strongly suggests Although no arguments about hedging and efficient
markets were marshaled in support of the predictor-that part of this representation is present within the OFS.
Faster-than Exponential Discounting valuation model, it can be shown that the model in equa-
tion 3 is analogous to the formulation first proposed byOne behavioral construct of valuation that has capti-
vated economists is the problem of intertemporal choice Black and Scholes as a method to set a fair price for
options on securities (Montague and Baldwin, unpub-(Lowenstein and Elster, 1992). It has been observed
across a wide range of species, ranging from pigeons lished data). This odd connection may simply be a coin-
cidence; however, it is possible that the connection be-to humans, that animals prefer a smaller, immediate
reward over a larger, delayed one. For example, given tween the two approaches is symptomatic of a more
fundamental biological connection. The Black-Scholesthe hypothetical choice of receiving $100 immediately
or $200 in two years, most people will choose the $100 class of equations was initially developed in an effort to
provide a principled approach to the way that optionsnow; the same people do not prefer $100 in 6 years to
$200 in 8 years (Lowenstein and Elster, 1992; Thaler, should be priced; that is, they sought a normative solu-
tion that matched real market data. The eventual price1981). Aspects of these findings in humans may be at-
tributable to an element of trust, i.e., the belief that such of options in a real market is set by the behavior of lots
of individual brains expressing their valuations throughpayoffs will actually occur in the distant future, but this
trust component is indistinguishable from the uncer- a propensity to buy or sell at specific prices. These
brains have long been equipped with rapid valuationtainty that time itself imposes on the belief of a payoff.
The replication of similarly nonrational choices in other mechanisms crafted to deal with vast number of stimuli
and possible behavioral acts available to them. We de-animals suggests that time value is represented funda-
mentally as part of any neural encoding scheme. rived the predictor-valuation model based on the need
to extend the reward prediction-error model to includeA remarkably simple assay of valuation is the rate at
which pigeons will peck for a reward (Herrnstein, 1961). the way that the system should value future promises
of reward; in particular, promises made by reward pre-By varying the amount of the reward and the time of
delivery, one can estimate the internal valuation struc- dictors. Our assumptions were based on the simplest
model through which uncertainty adjusted the system’sture, namely the value of time. Even in pigeons, valua-
tions are said to be dynamically inconsistent, and this current estimate of reward. We suspect that the equa-
tion discovered initially by Black and Scholes and ex-observation has been used to explain everything from
rate of savings (Laibson, 1997) to alcoholism (Heyman, tended by Merton (1990) may have hit upon a form of
solution long-ago embedded in the valuation systems2000). Early economic models of so-called discounted
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present in hominid brains. In this sense, their derivation possible actions to end up in one of many succeeding
states.in terms of a hedged portfolio simply led them to a class
of equation describing the valuations carried out by the These three components are used in combination with
some model of the environment to produce a reinforce-individual brains that compose any marketplace. Such
biological connections suggest that brain science may ment learning system. They are clearly present in the
decision-making model presented in the text.well provide constraints that can help stabilize certain
markets. The computational goal of learning is to use a set of
sensory cues x(t) {x1(t), x2(t), x3(t), . . .} (e.g., characteriz-
ing the current state of an organism) to fit a “value”
Conclusion function V*(x(t)) that values the current state as the aver-
In summary, the predictor-valuation model suggests age discounted sum of all future rewards from time t
identifiable neural substrates that may support sophisti- onward:
cated economic evaluations of diverse stimuli. This in-
terpretation is strengthened by the kind of learning and V*(x(t))  E{0r(t  0)  1r(t  1)  2r(t  2) …}. (4)
adaptation displayed by dopaminergic circuits during
E is the expected value operator (the average). r(t) is thereward-dependent learning and the possible influence
reward at time t, r(t  1) is the reward at time t  1, andof this signal in sequential decision making. Altogether,
so on.  is a discount factor that ranges between zerowe strongly suspect that a new generation of electro-
and one and captures the idea that rewards in the nearphysiological results in animals and neuroimaging re-
future are more valuable than rewards in the distantsults in humans may well forge a connection between
future. If the true (optimal) V*(x(t)) could be estimatedneural responses and direct measures of economic be-
by a system, then the system could use such an estimatehaviors. A connection that should provide insights into
to update its internal model of future rewards and futurethe valuations carried out by individual nervous systems
actions predicated on the expected receipt of thoseand their quantitative relationship to valuations carried
rewards. This would give the system a way to simulateout by real markets.
possible future action sequences and value them ac-
cording to their expected long-term returns.
Appendix A: Reinforcement-Learning and the TD Adjusting the Predictions (Weights)
Prediction-Error Model of Dopamine Function The strategy of TD learning is to use a set of sensory
There are three basic components to every reinforce- cues x(t)  {x1(t),x2(t),x3(t),…} present in a learning trial
ment-learning system: (1) a reward function, (2) a value along with a set of adaptable weights w(t) 
function, and (3) a policy. These relatively abstract terms {w1(t),w2(t),w3(t),…} to make an estimate V(x(t)) of the true
capture the idea of immediate evaluation (reward func- V*(x(t)). In this formulation, the weights act as predictions
tion), long-term judgment (value function), and action of future reward. For completeness, we add here a re-
selection (policy): mark about the weights. The weight associated with
The reward function formalizes the idea of a goal for each sensory cue, e.g., w1(t) associated with sensory
a reinforcement learning system. It assigns to each state cue 1, is actually a collection of weights, one for each
of the agent a single numerical quantity–the reward. The time point following the appearance of sensory cue 1.
reward function defines what is good right now and Local Data Anticipate Long-Term Reward
can be viewed as a built-in assessment of each state The difficulty in actually adjusting weights to estimate
available to the agent (learner). It is also used to define V(x(t)) is that the system (i.e., the animal) would have to
the agent’s goal: to maximize the total reward. wait to receive all its future rewards in a trial r(t  1),
The value function formalizes the notion of longer- r(t  2), r(t  3) . . . to assess its predictions. This latter
term assessments (judgements) about each state of the constraint would require the animal to remember over
agent. It provides a valuation of the current state of the time which weights need changing and which weights
agent taking into account the succession of states that do not. Fortunately, there is information available at each
could follow. Formally, for each state, value is defined instant in time that can act as a surrogate prediction
as the total amount of reward the agent can expect from error. This possibility is implicit in the definition of V*(x(t))
that state forward into the distant future. These values since it satisfies a condition of consistency through time:
would have to be stored in some fashion within the
V*(x(t))  E{r(t)  V*(x(t  1))  V*(x(t))}. (5)agent. In practice, the learner uses the reward function
to improve its internal estimate of the value function.
Since the estimate V satisfies the same condition, anIn short hand, rewards are immediate and values are
error, , in the estimated value function V (estimatedlong-term. For example, a rat may take many steps
predictions) can now be defined using information avail-across an electrified grid (low reward) to reach food
able at successive timesteps, i.e., taking the difference(high reward). All those intermediate states (steps on
between both sides of the above equation and ignoringthe grid) have very low reward but possess high value
the expected value operator E for clarity.because they directly lead to future states with food
(high reward). (t)  r(t)  V(x(t  1))  V(x(t)). (6)
A policy formalizes exactly what the word implies:
“given this, do that.” Formally, a policy maps states to  is called the TD error and acts as a surrogate prediction
error signal which is instantly available at time t  1. Ifactions. In both biological and machine-learning exam-
ples, a policy is usually probabilistic. For a given state, the estimated predictions are correct then V*(x(t)) 
V(x(t)), and the average prediction error is zero, i.e.,a policy defines the probability of taking one of many
Neuron
282
E[]  0. In other words, if the system can adjust its fe 





fc (13)weights (predictions) appropriately, then it can learn to
expect future rewards predicted by the collection of
This shows that fe  fc (see equation 8 above). Sincesensory cues.
the optimal allocation curve is concave downward, this
extremum is a maximum.Appendix B: Decision Tasks
A Value Illusion: Action-Choice Model DrivenLinear Reward Functions
by Prediction Error Is Strongly AttractedIn the matching shoulders task illustrated and described
to the Crossing Point in Reward Functionsin Figure 11, the reward functions, rA and rB, are linear
In the matching shoulders task, the reward functionsin f (fractional allocation to choice A), that is,
are linear in f, the fractional allocation to choice A. In
rA(f)  kA  mAf and rB(f)  kB  mBf. (7) the rising optimum task, the reward functions are ap-
proximately linear near the crossing point; therefore,
The crossing point of the linear reward functions occurs they inherit the conditions from above (see equations
when r  rB  rA  0, that is, at the allocation fc where: 7–13). In these cases, the attraction of the model for the




. (8) how the probability for choosing A changes as a func-
tion of f.
The likelihood, PA, for choosing A is a sigmoidal func-The Optimal Return is Quadratic in Average
tion of w (see text), the difference (wB  wA) in theAllocation to A
weights associated with choices A and B. At each selec-The linearity of the reward functions also implies that
tion, the weight association with the selection is updatedthe average return is equal to the return on the average
by a simple delta rule:allocation, that is,
rA(f)  kA  mAf  kA  mAf  rA(f). (9) wi  i  (ri  wi), (14)
Therefore, the expected value of the return R for an where iA, B. If the learning rate, , is set appropriately,
average allocation f to choice A is: the weights will (on average) track the reward functions
so that
E(R)  frA(f)  (1  f)rB(f)
r  w. (15) (mA  mB)f2  (10)
(kA  mB  kB)f  kB. Substituting r for w in the equation for the likelihood
of choosing A yields PA, a useful approximation for PA:
Expression 10 is found by plugging in the linear approxi-
mations from equation 7, and it illustrates why the opti- PA(f)  (1  e	w)1  (1  e	r)1
mal average return, as a function of f, should possess
 (1  e	(kdmdf ))1  PA (f ), (16)a quadratic dependence on the average allocation to
choice A. This fact is illustrated by the dashed line in
where kd  kB  kA and md  mB  mA. Now ask howFigure 11 and represents the best average return that
PA changes as a function of f by simply differentiatingcould be achieved at each allocation to A.
it with respect to f. For a fixed 	, we obtainMatching Shoulders Task: Why Do the Optimum
and Crossing Point Coincide?





(1  e	r)1 (17)
point, coincides with the optimal allocation to A for the
matching shoulders task. This is also a useful result for
cases where the reward functions are nearly linear in  
amdemdf
(1  bemdf )2
for positive constants a,b .
the vicinity of the crossing point.
We seek fe, the average allocation to A that extrem-
To the right of the crossing point, md  0, PA(f), md izes E(R), the expected value of the total reward (equa-
0, PA(f ) strictly decreases (PA/f is negative) and ap-tion 10 from above). Differentiate E(R) with respect to
proaches zero very rapidly for increasing f. To the leftfe, set the result to 0, and solve for fe:
of the crossing point, md  0, PA(f) strictly increases
(PA/f is positive) and approaches (1  e	kd)1 for de-E(R)
f
 2(mA  mB)f  (kA  mB  kB). (11) creasing f. In the matching shoulders task, kd  1/2,
making PA(0; 	 2)  0.73. This shows why the decision
Setting this derivative to 0 yields fe: model gets stuck near the crossing point.
fe 
kB  kA mB
2(mA  mB)
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